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Article 8

Doyle v. Ortega: Is Specific Performance Available
for Buyers in an Earnest Money Contract?*
In a recent Idaho Supreme Court opinion, the buyers in an earnest
money contract were denied the remedy of specific performance. 1
Although the stare decisis impact of this case is limited to the State of
Idaho, the topic is worthy of discussion for three reasons. First, this
decision has a broad effect on people, as most people enter into an
earnest money contract when they are purchasing a home. Second, both
contract and real estate law are areas traditionally reserved for the states.
Thus, a ruling from the highest state court is the final word on the law.
Finally, the opinion in Dayle v. Onega lacks sufficient legal analysis and
authority to support the holding. Bringing the court's errors to light
could help reverse a similar holding in a future case and help other
jurisdictions avoid the same pit-falls.
Part I of this note gives the background of Dayle v. Onega. Part II
reviews the court's analysis of the case. Part III examines the court's
decision under general rules of contract law not considered by the Dayle
court. Part IV concludes that the court erred by not granting the buyers
specific performance.
I.

BACKGROUND

Dayle v. Onega considers a real estate contract between the seller,
Tom Ortega, and the buyers, Patrick Doyle and Laurie Rowlett-Doyle.
The case presents the court with two main issues: first, whether the
parties had entered into a contract; and second, if there was a contract,
whether the default clause precluded the buyers from obtaining the
remedy of specific performance when the seller failed to consummate the
sale. 2
* Copyright <D 1995 Robert L. Phillips. The author takes sole responsibility for the
opinions and any analytical deficiencies in this note. However, I would like to thank the
members of Hopkins, Roden, Crockett, Hansen & Hoopes for their inspiration. Their concern
for and participation in the Idallo Falls, Idallo community was a great example for me. Thanks
for teaching me that there is more to being an attorney than simply practicing law. Their
genuine concern for people, their community, and their profession will influence my entire
legal career. The firm's Friday morning meetings may not solve all the world's problems, but
it is a good start. I would also like to thank Michelle, Elizabeth, Joshua, and Nathan for their
unselfish love and support.
I. Doyle v. Ortega, 872 P.2d 721,724 (ldallo 1994).
2. See id.
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Tom Ortega listed real property that he owned with a broker for
$32,000. 3 "Patrick Doyle and Laurie Rowlett-Doyle (the Doyles) visited
[this listed] property and decided to purchase it. " 4 The Doyles offered
$28,000 for the property by submitting an earnest money agreement,
which explained the terms of their proposal. 5 Ortega rejected this offer
and counter-offered to sell the property for $30,000 if the Doyles would
modify four terms in their initial offer. 6 First, the down payment at
closing had to be increased to $6,000. 7 Second, monthly payments had
to be increased to $231.61. 8 Third, the Doyles would pay all the longterm escrow fees and the closing agent's fees. 9 Finally, the earnest
money had to be deposited with a Rock Springs, Wyoming bank. 10
Ortega's realtor prepared a new earnest money agreement.
However, the realtor forgot to incorporate all of the changes discussed
with Ortega before sending a copy of the new earnest money agreement
to the Doyles. 11 Upon receipt of the new earnest money agreement, the
Doyles signed it and returned it to their realtor. 12
Before sending a copy of the new earnest money agreement to
Ortega, Ortega's realtor realized that the wrong boxes had been marked,
indicating that Ortega, not the Doyles, would be responsible for the
closing costs. 13 Ortega's realtor corrected Ortega's copy of the new

3. ld. at 722.
4. ld.
5. Id. The earnest money agreement was composed of a fonn real estate purchase and
sale agreement and receipt for earnest money dated March 11, 1991. See Real Estate Purchase
& Sale Agreement & Receipt for Earnest Money, RE-21 , prepared by Ada County Association
of REALTORS (Rev. 1-90) [hereinafter Doyles' Earnest Money Contract] (copy of the actual
contract between the Doyles and Ortega, on file with the author); cj, e.g., Real Estate
Purchase & Sales Agreement& Receipt for Earnest Money, RE-21,prepared by Ada County
Association of REALTORS (Rev. 9-92) (the 1992 version of the earnest money prepared by
the same organization that prepared the form used by the Doyles and Ortega contract); Real
Estate Purchase and Sales Agreement (with Earnest Money Provision), RE-21 (Rev. 4-83)
(example of another version of an earnest money contract by an unidentified drafter). The
offer for $28,000 consisted of $5,600 down, then monthly payments of principal and interest
for five years at $216.19, and the balance would be due in a balloon payment at the end of the
five years. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 722.
6. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 722. Ortega's counteroffer is a new offer, which acted as a
rejection of the Doyles' previous offer. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 39
(1979).
7. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 722.
8. ld.
9. ld. The Doyle's initial offer proposed that these fees would be shared. ld.
10. ld.
11. ld.
12. ld.
13. Id. It is important to note that Ortega's realtor "marked the wrong boxes." ld. As
with most earnest money contracts, these are standardized forms with boilerplate language
which is usually not negotiated. The items usually negotiated are the price, the payment plan,
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earnest money agreement to reflect that the Doyles would be responsible
for closing costs as agreed. Ortega eventually signed this copy. 14
The Doyles' realtor learned of the revisions and called Patrick Doyle,
who orally agreed to all of Ortega's revisions that were not contained in
their copy of the new earnest money agreement. 15 The Doyles' realtor
also "prepared an addendum to the new earnest money agreement in an
effort to incorporate all of the revisions. " 16
Patrick Doyle returned the signed addendum to his realtor.
However, "Ortega never signed his copy of the addendum. " 17 When
the Doyles' demanded that Ortega consummate the sale, he refused. 18
The Doyles brought a suit for specific performance, claiming that
damages would not be sufficient since the property was unique. 19
Ortega countered that he had never entered into a contract. 20 Alternatively, if there was a contract, he claimed that the default clause in the
new earnest money contract "made it clear that the Doyles' only remedy
was the return of their earnest money and reimbursement fur their
costs. " 21 Ortega based this argument on the default clause on the
reverse side of the earnest money contract. 22 The default clause
provided that the seller was entitled to retain the earnest money if the
buyer breached, but retention of the earnest money did not waive other
rights and remedies. 23 In contrast, if the seller breached, the default

the financing, and which party is responsible for the various closing and administrative costs.
See Doyles' Earnest Money Contract, supra note 5.
14. Doyle, 872 P.2d 722.
15. ld.
16. ld. Additionally, the addendum extended the closing date but omitted the
requirement that the earnest money be transferred to the Rock Springs National Bank. The
closing date was extended because "Ortega did not obtain the requisite septic tank approval
from the health department until May 8, 1991. . . . The addendum omitted the requirement
that the earnest money be transferred to Rock Springs because the realtor concluded that Idaho
law required that the earnest money be held in trust in Idaho." /d. at 722-23.
17. ld. at 723
18. ld.
19. ld.
20. ld.
21. ld.
22. ld.
23. See id. The default clause afforded the following remedies for the seller:
S. Default: If Seller executes this agreement, and title to the subject property is
marketable and insurable and the Buyer fails, neglects or refuses to comply with the
terms of any conditions of sale set forth herein within five (5) days from the date on
which said term or condition is to be complied with, then the earnest money, upon
written request of the Seller shall be forfeited and the Buyer's interest in the property,
if any, shall be terminated. The holder of the earnest money as designated herein
shall pay from the earnest money forfeited by the Buyer the cost of title insurance,
escrow fees, attorney's fees and any other expenses directly incurred by or on behalf
of the Buyer and Seller in connection with this transaction and the remainder shall be
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clause required the seller to return the buyer's earnest money. 24 The
clause was silent as to whether other rights and remedies were reserved
or waived. 25 Ortega essentially claimed that this silence taken with the
seller's expressed reservation of rights constituted the buyers' waiver of
other remedies.
After reviewing these clauses, the trial court concluded that there was
insufficient evidence to prove that the liquidated damages were meant to
be the exclusive remedy. 26 Therefore, the trial court granted a partial
summary judgment to the Doyles for specific performance. 27 At trial,
"the trial court also found that the parties had reached a meeting of the
minds about all the essential terms of the sale and purchase of the
property and had intended to be contractually bound. " 28 The trial court
granted the buyers specific performance, but the supreme court reversed
that ruling. 29

II.

THE IDAHO SUPREME

Comrr's

ANALYSIS

In deciding whether the buyers were entitled to specific performance,
the court faced two issues. First, was there a contract between the seller
and the buyers? 30 If a contract did not exist, other issues, including
specific performance, were moot. Second, what remedies were the
buyers entitled to if the seller breached the contract? Specifically, were
the buyers entitled to specific performance under this particular earnest
money agreement? 31

apportioned one-half to the Seller and one-half to the Broker. holding the earnest
money, provided the amount to the Broker does not exceed the agreed commission.
The payment by Broker as aforesaid shall not constitute a waiver of any other rights
or remedies available to the Seller and/or Broker. Buyer shall be responsible for any
and all costs or fees incurred by or on behalf of the Buyer.
/d. (emphasis added).
24. /d. If the seller breached the contract, the contract provided the following remedies
for the buyer:
If the Seller, having approved said sale fails to consummate the same as herein
agreed, the Earnest Money shall be returned to the Buyer less such charges and other
costs or fees incurred or committed for use by or on behalf of the Buyer hereunder
and Seller shall pay for the cost of title insurance, escrow and legal fees, if any, and
reimburse Buyer for that portion of the Earnest Money expended or committed on
behalf of the Buyer which cannot be refunded.
/d.
25. /d.
26. /d.
27. /d.
28. /d.
29. /d.
30. /d. at 723-24.
31. /d. at 724.
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The Court's Analysis of Whether a Contract Existed

The supreme court's analysis of whether a contract existed was very
brief. To reverse the trial court's decision, the seller, Ortega, had to
establish that the trial court's decision was not supported by substantial
evidence or, in other words, was "clearly erroneous. " 32 This standard
of review required Ortega to show that there was no "substantial and
competent evidence to support the trial court's findings. " 33
After reviewing the facts, the supreme court held that there was
substantial and competent evidence to support the trial court's findings. 34
Only the contract term requiring the earnest money to be placed with a
bank in Rock Springs was at issue because the money had never been
placed there. 35 However, the court held that placing the earnest money
in a particular bank in Rock Springs was inconsequential in deciding
whether the parties had a meeting of the minds. 36
B.

The Court's Analysis of Specific Performance

Before addressing the issue of specific performance, the court
addressed its standard of review for contracts. The standard of review
was contingent upon whether the contract was ambiguous. 37 If the
contract was held ambiguous, its interpretation would be a question of
fact. If the contract was not ambiguous, its interpretation would be a
question of law over which the court could exercise free review. 38 The

32. See id.
33. ld.
34. ld.
35. /d.
36. /d. A violation of the statute of frauds was the only other argument questioning
whether there was a contract between Ortega and the Doyles. This issue arose because land
transfers of real property must be in writing, and Patrick Doyle at one point orally agreed to
the changes of Ortega. Compare id. at 722 with IDAHO CoDE § 9-503 ( 1990) (discussion and
law regarding the Statute of Frauds). However, neither the trial court nor the supreme court
allowed this argument since Ortega did not bring the issue up in his pleadings. Doyle, 872
P.2d at 724. Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, if the statue of frauds is not raised as
an affirmative defense, it is waived. See id at 724 (citing IDAHO R. CIV. P. 8(c) (1994)).
37. If the contract is ambiguous, the question of the parties' intent is a factual question
where deference is given to the trial court, see Doyle, 872 P.2d at 724, and the standard of
review is clearly erroneous. IDAHO R. CIV. P. 52(a) (1994). If the contract is not ambiguous,
the court can interpret the contract as a matter of law.
38. See Doyle, 872P.2dat724 (quotingBondyv. Levy, 829P.2d 1342, 1345-46(1daho
1992)) (stating that free review is the same standard as de novo review); see also Robert M.
Tyler, Jr., Practices and StrategiesjoraSuccessjulAppeal, 16AM. J. TRlALADVOC. 617,618
(1993).
According to the court, the rules regarding the review of contracts were well established:
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supreme court held that the default clause in the earnest money contract
was not ambiguous. 39 The court then, using the standard of free
review, reversed the trial court's holding and concluded that the default
clause limited the buyer to the remedy stated in the contract. 40 This
conclusion was based on two factors. First, the court compared the
seller's default clause to the buyers'. The seller's default clause provided
for retention of the earnest money by the seller and broker upon the
buyers' default and did not waive "any other rights or remedies
available. " 41 Conversely, the buyers' default clause made no such
reservation, so the court concluded that other remedies were precluded
and the buyers were limited to the return of their earnest money. 42
Second, the supreme court held that returning the earnest money was
"inconsistent with specific performance." However, the court never
explained this inconsistency. 43 Apparently, these remedies are inconsistent because returning the earnest money means canceling the deal while
specific performance means consummating it. This or some other
difference not expressed persuaded the court that allowing both remedies
would unjustly enrich the buyers.
The court supported its denial of specific performance with Margaret
H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky. 44 In Lipsky the contract contained a liquidat-

The primary objective in construing a contract is to discover the intent of the parties,
and in order to effectuate this objective, the contract must be viewed as a whole and
considered in its entirety. The primary consideration in interpreting an ambiguous
contract is to determine the intent of the parties. The determination ofthe contract's
meaning and legal effect are questions of law to be decided by the court where the
contract is clear and unambiguous. However, where the Contract is determined to
be ambiguous, the interpretation of the document presents a question of fact which
focuses upon the intent of the parties. The determination of whether a contract is
ambiguous or not is a question of law over which we may exercise free review, and
in determining whether a contract is ambiguous, our task is to ascertain whether the
contract is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation.
Doyle, 872 P.2d at 724. (quoting Bond v. Levy, 829 P.2d 1342, 1344-46 (Idaho 1992)).
39. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 724.
40. ld. at 725. The buyers' remedy under the default clause is as follows:
If the Seller, having approved said sale fails to consummate the same as herein
agreed, the Earnest Money shall be returned to the Buyer less such charges and other
costs or fees incurred or committed for use by or on behalf of the Buyer hereunder
and Seller shall pay for the cost of title insurance, escrow and legal fees, if any, and
reimburse Buyer for that portion of the Earnest Money expended or committed on
behalf of Buyer which cannot be refunded.
ld. at 723.
41. ld.
42. ld. at 723-25.
43. ld. at 724-25.
44. ld. at 725 (citing Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 846 P.2d 904, 908-09 (Idaho
1993)).
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ed damages clause with a reservation of other remedies for both the buyer
and the seller. 45 Although the supreme court in Lipsky found that the
seller had the right to specific performance because of the reservation, it
stated that "[t]his is not to say, however, that an agreement for the
purchase of real property may not be clearly drafted so as to limit the
seller's remedy to retaining the earnest money deposit as liquidated
damages. " 46 The Doyle court did not explain the significance of the
Lipsky case. It only noted that both the buyer and the seller in Lipsky had
a reservation of "other remedies" in the default clause, 47 which implicitly included the right of specific performance.
Additionally, the supreme court ignored significant differences
between the two cases. In contrast to the earnest contract in Lipsky, the
earnest money contract in Doyle expressly reserved "other rights" to the
seller but not to the buyers. 48 Therefore, the court held that the buyers
were not entitled to any rights other than those expressed in the default
clause; specifically, the buyers were limited to the return of their earnest
money. 49 Thus, the Doyle court's holding implied that the earnest
money contract was so clearly drafted that it limited the buyer to the
remedies expressed in the contract. 50 Implicitly, the supreme court
declared that if a party does not reserve "other rights" in the contract, a
party is limited to those remedies expressed in the contract.
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION

On the surface, the court's conclusion that the buyer is not entitled
to specific performance appears reasonable. However, upon careful
examination it is apparent that the court skipped some fundamental steps
of analysis and ignored several basic rules of interpreting contracts. This
note focuses on four weaknesses in the Doyle opinion: (1) the lack of
authority and flawed reasoning; (2) contract interpretation in favor of the
drafter; (3) the court's failure to interpret the contract according to form
contract rules; and (4) the inequity resulting from the opinion. The court
could have arrived at a different conclusion by correctly dealing with any
of these four factors. Taken together, these weaknesses in the Doyle
opinion clearly indicate that the court reached the wrong result.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Lipsky, 846 P.2d at 908-09.
ld. at 909; see also Doyle, 872 P.2d at 725.
Doyle, 872 P.2d at 725.
See id. at 723.
ld. at 725.
See id. at 724-25.
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Lack of Authority and Reasoning Flaws in the Doyle Opinion

Insufficient authority to support its holding

The only authority cited by the supreme court to support its denial
of the buyers' request for specific performance is Margaret H. Wayne
Trust v. Lipsky. 51 Lipsky stated in dicta that a purchase agreement may
be clearly drafted so as to limit the seller's remedy to the liquidated
damages. 52 However, a few key points distinguish Lipsky from Doyle.
First, Lipsky actually held that the liquidated damages clause or default
clause did not limit the seller's remedies, which is the opposite holding
of the Doyle opinion. 53 Second, Lipsky focused on the seller's remedies,
whereas Doyle focused on the buyer's remedies. 54 This is significant
because the buyer of the land has a stronger argument for specific
performance than the seller since land is unique. 55 Additionally, in
Doyle the buyers were the nondrafters56 while in Lipsky the seller
drafted the agreement. 57 Third, the dicta that the court relied upon in
Lipsky requires a limitation of remedies to be clearly drafted in the agreement. 58 When applying the clearly-drafted requirement to the facts in
Doyle, it is doubtful whether failing to reserve "other rights" for one
party in a nonnegotiated clause passes the clearly-drafted test. Fourth,
Lipsky creates a presumption that a party has a choice of remedies unless
there is evidence to the contrary. This presumption is found in the Lipsky
court's citation of Professor Dobbs' treatise on damages:
The presence of a liquidated damages provision does not automatically prevent the vendor from claiming his actual damages, and in the
absence of any indication to the contrary, it probably should be assumed
that the vendor is free to claim liquidated or actual damages, at his
option. 59

51. ld. at 725 (citing Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 846 P.2d 904 (Idaho 1993)).
52. ld.; cf ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM Er AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY, § 10.5 (1984)
("[A] liquidated damages clause may be construed to exclude other remedies such as specific
performance; likewise, a clause in the contract may expressly deny specific performance.")
53. Lipsky, 846 P.2d at 904.
54. See infra note 120 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between the
buyer's and seller's right to specific performance).
55. See infra note 120.
56. See infra part III.B.
57. Lipsky, 846 P.2d at 906. The seller in Lipsky was the drafting party because her
form contract was used. ld.; see infra part III. C.
58. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 725; Lipsky, 846 P.2d at 909.
59. Lipsky, 846 P.2d at 909 (citing DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
REMEDIES § 12.11 (2d ed. 1993)) (emphasis added).
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Thus, rather than supporting the Doyle opinion, Lipsky's reference to
Professor Dobbs sets up a rebuttable presumption for the Doyle court to
overcome. Apparently, the Doyle court believed evidence existed in the
default clause to limit the buyers' remedies. However, neither the Lipsky
court nor the Doyle court ever directly addressed whether failure to
reserve remedies for only one party, the nondrafting buyers in the Doyle
case, is sufficient to overcome the Dobbs presumption.
In summary, only dicta in Lipsky supports the Doyle court's
conclusion. The facts are easily distinguishable, and the clearly-drafted
standard is only supported by the buyer's silence. Furthermore, Lipsky
presumes that rights are not waived. This presumption actually supports
the buyers' position, which would entitle them to specific performance.
2. Using the wrong standard of review and overlooking factual
ambiguities
The court made another mistake in determining the standard of
review. The court held, without any analysis, that the contract was not
subject to any reasonably conflicting interpretations; thus it could
interpret the contract as a matter of law under the standard of free
review. 60 However, when concluding that the contract was not subject
to reasonably conflicting interpretations, the court never considered
alternative interpretations of the default clause. The absence of such
discussion and the court's conclusory analysis cause one to wonder if any
consideration was given to alternative interpretations.
The contract was silent as to whether the buyers had any remedies
in addition to the return of their earnest money. This silence could have
been interpreted in at least three different ways: (1) the silence clearly
indicated that the parties did not intend specific performance as buyers'
remedy, (2) the silence created ambiguity, or (3) the silence clearly did
not state a waiver of the buyers right to specific performance.
The court's interpretation was that the contract's silence concerning
remedies clearly indicated that the parties did not intend specific performance as a remedy for the buyers. 61 The buyers were therefore limited
to the return of their earnest money because that was the only remedy
stated in the default clause. 62

60. Under the free review standard, the supreme court could review the trial court record
and contract de novo. See Tyler, supra note 38 (stating that free review and de novo review
are the same standard).
61. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 724-25.
62. ld.
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The court could have found that the contract's silence created
ambiguity as to whether the buyers gave up their right to specific performance. Since this was a form contract, the parties neither considered nor
negotiated the terms of the default clause so one must consider the
parties' intent. 63 The parties' intent is a factual question, requiring
greater deference to the trial court's decision. 64 Additionally, as a
factual question, the parties' intent would not be subject to free review.65
The court might also have found that, in light of the contract's
silence on buyers' remedies, the contract did not clearly state a waiver of
the buyers right to specific performance. 66 Because the contract did not
clearly state that the buyers gave up their right to specific performance,
they are still entitled to that remedy. 67 No language in the earnest
money's default clause nor any extrinsic evidence indicated that the
buyers intended to waive other remedies. The liquidation clause could
have been a floor for damages rather than a ceiling as the court interpreted it. 68 Thus, by interpreting the contract as a matter of law under
the free review standard, the court could have easily found that the
buyers were entitled to specific performance.
The important point is not which interpretation above is correct, but
rather that these three viable, conflicting interpretations create a factual
issue about intent that precludes free review. 69 Since the Doyle opinion
only mentions the first alternative, whether the other interpretations were
even considered is uncertain. These other reasonable interpretations
created an issue of fact, which could only be resolved by looking at the
parties' intent. Because the parties' intent is a factual question, 70 the
supreme court could have only overturned the trial court's decision71 if
the decision was clearly erroneous. 72 Under the higher standard of
clearly erroneous, the Doyle court would have been obligated to uphold

63. See infra part III.C.
64. Rutter v. McLaughlin, 612 P.2d 135, 136 (Idaho 1980).
65. See Doyle, 872 P.2d at 724.
66. This interpretation is opposite of that used by the Doyle court.
67. See discussion of waivers infra part III.A.3.
68. See DOBBS, supra note 59 § 12.9(5).
69. See DeLancey v. DeLancey, 714 P.2d 32, 34 (Idaho 1986); Rutterv. McLaughlin,
612 P.2d 135, 136 (Idaho 1980).
70. Ada County Assessor v. Taylor, 861 P.2d 1215, 1218-19 (Idaho 1993); Hilt v.
Draper, 836 P.2d 558, 563 (Idaho. Ct. App. 1992).
71. The trial court held that there was insufficient evidence to support the claim that the
liquidated damages clause was intended to be the buyers' exclusive remedy. Doyle v. Ortega,
872 P.2d 721, 723 (Idaho 1994).
72. Rutter, 612 P.2d at 136.
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the trial court's decision, 73 which granted specific performance of the
contract. Thus, by overlooking other reasonable, conflicting interpretations, the supreme court used the wrong standard of review to reach the
wrong result.

3.

Inconsistency with the waiver of rights

The court's holding is inconsistent with the equitable doctrine of
waiver in three ways. First, a waiver is ordinarily a question of fact that
the trier of fact decides. 74 Second, there was no expressed waiver of
right and the high standard for an implied waiver was not met. Third,
a person with unclean hands cannot ask for an equitable remedy such as
a waiver.
First, using the free review standard for a waiver is erroneous since
"the existence of [a] waiver ordinarily is a question of fact, and if there
is any substantial evidence in the record to support a waiver, it is for the
trier of fact to determine whether the evidence establishes such a
waiver. " 75 In trying to overcome the trial court's factual finding, the
supreme court erroneously disregarded the findings of the trial court, the
fact finder, 76 and interpreted a factual issue as a matter of law.
Although the court could argue that interpreting an unambiguous contract
was a matter of law, 77 the existence of a waiver of remedies, based on
the buyers' omission, was a question of fact.
Second, the Doyle opinion did not present evidence to support an
expressed or implied waiver of the buyers' equitable right to specific
performance. The court in Doyle inferred that since the seller reserved
rights other than the liquidated damages clause and the buyer did not, the
buyer was not entitled to any other remedy. This reasoning goes against
the general rule that a waiver of rights requires an "intentional relinquishment of a known right. " 78 The opinion cited no expressions by the

73. The supreme court will uphold a trial court's decision as long as there is substantial
competent evidence to support that decision. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 724. The trial court claimed
there was insufficient evidence to support the seller's claim that returning the buyers' earnest
money was the exclusive remedy. /d. Thus, the supreme court could only reverse the trial
court's factual finding by showing in the record that the parties intended to make the return of
the buyers' earnest money the exclusive remedy. Since the facts do not warrant such a finding,
the supreme court had no basis to overturn the trial court.
74. Medical Services Group v. Boise Lodge No. 310, Benevolent and Protective Order
of Elks, 878 P.2d 789, 793 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994).
75. /d.
76. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 723-25.
77. /d. at 724.
78. Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 846 P.2d 904, 907 (Idaho 1993); see also
BrandS. Corp. v. King, 639 P.2d 429, 432 (Idaho 1981); DOBBS, supra note 59 § 2.3(5)
("Waiver is an intentional, voluntary, and understanding relinquishment of a known right.").
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Doyles indicating they intended to relinquish or waive their right to
specific performance.
In Lipsky, the court held that "[t]o establish a waiver, the intention
to waive must clearly appear. " 79 A waiver was not clearly apparent in
the Doyles' contract. Lipsky also stated that a "[w]aiver will not be
inferred except from a clear and unequivocal act manifesting an intent to
waive or from conduct amounting to estoppel. " 80 Moreover, Lipsky
gave the task of weighing conflicting evidence in order to determine the
existence of a waiver to the trial court. 81 Further, the trial court's
findings should not be overturned on appeal unless there is a lack of
substantial and competent evidence to support its findings. 82
Without an expressed waiver, the supreme court needed to justify its
position through an implied waiver. Generally, an "implied waiver
consists of two elements: (1) reliance by the party seeking to assert a
waiver; and (2) direct and unequivocal conduct indicating a waiver. " 83
However, the facts do not sustain either prong of this test. Although
implied waiver is possible under Idaho law, proving it requires a high
standard of proof with the burden of proof on the party asserting the
waiver.
The problem for the seller in Doyle is that the evidence is insufficient
to meet the burden of proof for an implied waiver. 84 No facts establish
direct or unequivocal conduct by the Doyles indicating they intended to
give up their right to specific performance. Nor was there evidence that
Ortega, the seller, relied on the limitation of the buyers' remedy in the
default clause of the contract. The bottom line is that Ortega simply did
not meet the test for an implied waiver. Since the seller did not meet the
threshold test for an implied waiver and since the contract did not contain
an express waiver, the Doyles should have been entitled to specific
performance.

79. Lipsky, 846 P.2d at 907. See Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 650 P.2d 657,
662 (Idaho 1982).
80. Lipsky, 846 P. 2d at 907; Soloaga v. Bannock County, 809 P. 2d 1157, 1161 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1990); Jones v. Maestas, 696 P.2d 920, 922 (Idaho Ct. App. 1985).
81. Lipsky, 846 P.2d at 907.
82. See id. at 907-08; Price v. Aztec Limited, Inc., 701 P.2d 294, 298 (Idaho Ct. App.
1985); see also IDAHO R. Civ. P. 52(a) (1994) (indicating that a finding of facts shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous).
83. Idaho Migrant Council, Inc. v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 718 P.2d 1242,
1244 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986).
84. This may be why the trial court held there was insufficient evidence to prove that the
buyers intended to give up their right to specific performance. See Doyle, 872 P.2d at 723.
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Third, a person with unclean hands cannot seek a remedy in
equity. 85 Waiver is an equitable doctrine. 86 As an equitable remedy,
a waiver should not be granted haphazardly, especially in the form
contract setting to the breaching party. In Doyle, the seller, who
breached the contract, essentially asked the court to interpret the buyers'
silence as a waiver of rights. 87 Contrary to the clean hands doctrine, the
court waived the buyers' rights to specific performance by granting equity
to the breaching party. 88

4. Returning the buyers' earnest money is not inconsistent with
specific performance
Returning the buyers' earnest money is not inconsistent with specific
performance as the supreme court claimed. Presumably, if the buyers
were entitled to both specific performance and return of their earnest
money, the court felt the buyers would be unjustly enriched. The default
clause stated that if the seller defaulted, "the earnest money shall be
returned to the buyer. " 89 However, even if the buyers were entitled to
specific performance and return of their earnest money, they would not
be unjustly enriched. The following hypothetical situation illustrates this
point:
Assume the terms of the contract are as follows (1) earnest money
paid is $1,000, (2) sale price of the property is $30,000, and (3) other
costs are $500 and are the responsibility of the buyer to pay. Other costs
could be paid out of the earnest money during the final closing settlement.
If the buyers' remedy is limited to specific performance of the
contract, they are required to pay the seller $29,500 as stipulated by the
contract. The total cost of the property is $30,500 ($30,000 sale price
plus $500 for other costs). After subtracting the credit for the earnest
money, the amount owed is $29,500. Of the $1,000 of the earnest
money, $500 will be applied to the downpayment and the other $500 will
be used to pay for the buyers' other costs. The gross cost to the buyers
is $30,500 and the net proceeds to the sellers is $30,000.

85. Hoopes v. Hoopes, 861 P.2d 88, 92 (Idaho Ct. App. 1993) ("[H]e who comes in
equity must come with clean hands," and a party can be denied relief in an equity court if "his
conduct has been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent."). However, the clean hands
doctrine is not a straight jacket for a court. /d. The court should focus on conduct not
motives. ld.
86. See Idaho Migrant Council, 718 P.2d at 1244.
87. See Doyle, 872 P.2d at 722-25.
88. ld.
89. ld. at 723 (emphasis added) (quoting the earnest money contract between the Doyles
and Ortega).
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If the buyers were entitled to both the return of their earnest money
under the default clause and specific performance, the result is the same
as if the buyers were limited to specific performance. Assuming that all
closing costs have already been paid out of the earnest money, the seller
will· have to return the $500 of remaining earnest money and give the
buyer $500 out of his own pocket, which was taken from the earnest
money to cover other costs. When the contract is specifically enforced,
the buyer will have to pay the full price for the property, $30,000. The
buyers, under the terms of the contract, will also have to pay the other
costs of $500. However, since the seller has already paid this $500, the
seller would be entitled to reimbursement. The seller will have paid $500
out-of-pocket and then will have been reimbursed. Again, the gross cost
to the buyers is $30,500 and the net proceeds to sellers is $30,000. This
illustration demonstrates that the default clause remedy and specific
performance are not inconsistent with each other since the buyer was not
unjustly enriched and both transactions lead to the same result.

B.

Contract Interpretation in Favor of the Drafter

Besides the reasoning errors and lack of authority, the Doyle opinion
violated a basic rule of contract construction by interpreting the earnest
money contract in favor of the drafter. This is contrary to the longstanding rule that contracts are to be interpreted against the drafter. 90 In
Doyle, the first form was prepared by the buyers, but this was rejected
by the seller. 91 The seller then had his realtor draw up a new contract, 92 a counteroffer. 93 This new offer was accepted by the buyers.94 To clarify confusion about the contract terms, 95 the buyers'
broker drew up an addendum to the seller's contract to summarize all the

90. See USA Fertilizer, Inc. v. Idaho First National Bank, 815 P.2d 469,472 (Idaho Ct.
App. 1991); Luzar v. Western Surety Co., 692 P.2d 337, 341 (Idaho 1984); see also
REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1979) ("In choosing among the reasonable
meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred
which operates against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise
proceeds.") (emphasis added); CUNNINGHAM, supra note 52, § 10.4 ("Courts often enforce
forfeiture-of-deposit clauses only grudgingly. Since they are obviously designed to protect the
vendor, they are construed against him in cases of ambiguity.").
91. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 722.
92. See id.
93. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 39 (1979). Since the seller's realtor
used a standardized form, drawing up the contract consisted of filling in the spaces reserved
for negotiable terms. The liquidation clause was just boilerplate on the reverse side of the
contract. See Doyles' Earnest Money Contract, supra note 5.
94. See Doyle, 872 P.2d at 722.
95. None of the clarification related to default clause, id., which was in small print on
the reverse side of the seller's form. See Doyles' Earnest Money Contract, supra note 5. The
negotiation and clarification related to terms on the front side of the form.
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changes. 96 However, the important point is that the seller's earnest
money contract form was used, and the court interpreted the contract in
the seller's favor.
Arguably, the court could opine that this rule of contract construction
only applies if the contract is subject to reasonably conflicting interpretations.97 Since the court held that the contract was not ambiguous, 98 the
rule of interpreting a contract in favor of the nondrafter was a moot
issue.
However, in deciding whether the contract is ambiguous, the court
gave very little weight to the possibility that the contract might be subject
to reasonably conflicting interpretations. 99 As discussed above, 100 the
contract was subject to reasonably conflicting interpretations and thus
should have been considered ambiguous. When such an ambiguity exists,
the interpretation should favor the nondrafting party, which in this case
was the buyer. 101

C.

Failure to Conform to Form Contract Rules

From the court's opinion, it appears that the court treated the default
clause as if it were a negotiated part of the contract; however, this
interpretation is not supported by the facts. 102 Rather, the default
clause was just boilerplate language. 103
It is likely that neither party fully understood the extent of their
rights under the default clause. The default clause in Doyle was a
standard RE 21 earnest money contract, a form contract prepared by the
realty community. 104 As with all liquidated damages clauses, the

96. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 722-23.
97. See Suchan v. Suchan, 741 P.2d 1289, 1295 (Idaho 1987); USA Fertilizer Inc. v.
First Nat') Bank, 815 P.2d 469 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991).
98. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 724.
99. See supra Part III.A.2.
100. /d.
101. See USA Fertilizer, 815 P.2d at 472; Luzar v. Western Surety Co., 692 P.2d 337,
341 (Idaho !984); See also REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (1979) ("In
choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a renn thereof, that
meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies the words or from
whom a writing otherwise proceeds.") (emphasis added); CUNNINGHAM, supra note 52, § 10.4
("Courts often enforce forfeiture-of-deposit clauses only grudgingly. Since they are obviously
designed to protect the vendor, they are construed against him in cases of ambiguity.").
102. See Doyle, 872 P.2d at 722-24.
103. See, e.g., Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 846 P.2d 904, 906 (Idaho 1993)
(earnest money contract was on "a standard printed real estate purchase and sales agreement"
prepared by the seller); earnest money contracts listed in supra note 5.
104. See Doyles' Earnest Money Contract, supra note 5. All three of earnest money
contracts listed in supra note 5 have the default clause printed in small print on the reverse side
of the contract with no space provided for modification.
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weight given to them should be based on how large a part they played in
the negotiation process. 105 The facts do not suggest that the parties
even read or considered the clauses in their negotiations. 106
The Doyle earnest money contract illustrates the difficulty of
negotiating remedies in a form contract setting. The important negotiable
factors are found on the front side of a standardized carbon copy
form. 107 Such terms include the price and identify which party will pay
the various costs associated with the transaction. 108 When a price is
marked on the standard form, it is carbon copied to the broker's and
buyer's copies. However, the default clause is on the reverse side of the
form. 109 Any changes to the default clause cannot be carbon copied to
other copies of the agreement. 110 In other words, it would take a
sophisticated buyer making an extra effort in order to modify the default
clause. Additionally, the standard forms were prepared by the realty
community, 111 which is more significantly influenced by sellers and
brokers than by buyers. 112
The general rule regarding form contracts is that terms are considered part of an integrated agreement unless the party drafting the contract
(the seller) has reason to believe that the other party (the buyer) would
not have consented to the terms. 113 The issue the court should have
addressed is whether the buyers would have agreed to the default clause
if they knew they were not entitled to specific performance. This
question was not addressed by the court and cannot be answered from the
facts in the opinion.

105. See Jeffrey B. Coopersmith, Refocusing Liquidated Damages Law for Real Estate
Contracts: Returning to the Historical Roots ofthe Penalty Doctrine, 39 EMoRY L.J. 267, 298
(1990); cf Elizabeth Warren, Formal and Operative Rules Under Common Law and Code, 30
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 898, 916 (1983) (underliquidated damages clause present opportunity for
abuse partially because courts assume that they have been fairly negotiated).
106. See Doyle, 872 P.2d at 722-24.
107. See Doyles' Earnest Money Contract, supra note 5.
108. Jd.
109. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (citing to a copy of the earnest money
contract between the Doyles and Ortega as well as other copies of standardized earnest money
contracts).
110. ld.
111. ld.
112. This explains why the earnest money was split equally between the broker and seller
if the buyer defaulted as well as why retention of the earnest money did "not constitute a
waiver of any other rights or remedies" for the seller or broker. Doyle, 872 P.2d at 723.
113. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979).
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Inequity Resulting From the Doyle Opinion

Historical background of specific performance

Equitable remedies like specific performance were developed to grant
relief for the sometimes harsh and inadequate results of legal remedies.114 For example, remedies at law could only provide damages
(monetary compensation) when a party breached a contract, but could not
demand performance under the contract. 115 However, a court of equity
could order specific performance if the remedy at law (damages) was
inadequate. 116 Although Idaho, like many other states, has abolished
the distinction between courts of equity and courts at law, 117 many of
the rules associated with courts of equity and courts at law still apply.
For example, a party is not entitled to an equitable remedy for breach of
contract in Idaho unless the remedy at law is inadequate. 118 In contract
settings, damages often suffice since a party may be able to obtain
substitute performance. This is particularly true if the contract is for the
sale of goods. However, if the contract involves the sale of land,
damages may not be adequate because each parcel of land is thought to
be unique in character. 119 Thus, the nonbreaching party of a contract
to sell land is usually entitled to specific performance because of the
unique character of the land. 120

114. See generally CUNNINGHAM, supra note 52, §10.5.
115. Suchan v. Rutherford, 410 P.2d 434, 436-438, 441 (Idaho 1966).
116. /d.; see also JOHN D. CALAMARI&JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF CONTRACfS,
§ 16-2 (1987) ("[E]very interest in land was unique. Consequently, the remedy of damages
for breach of a contract to convey an interest in land was deemed inadequate."); CUNNINGHAM,
supra note 52, §I 0.5 ("[S]pecific performance should be ordered only when the remedy at law
is inadequate . . . . [e]ach parcel of land is unique . . . . Hence, damages are inadequate per
se.").
117. IDAHO CONST. art. 5, § I ("The distinctions between actions at law and suits in
equity, and the forms of all such actions and suits, are hereby prohibited; and there shall be
in this state but one form of action for the enforcement or protection of private rights or the
redress of private wrongs, which shall be denominated a civil action."); see Village of Peck
v. Denison, 450 P.2d 310, 316 (Idaho 1969) (McFadden, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
118. See Holscher v. James, 860 P.2d 646, 650 (ldalto !993); CUNNINGHAM, supra note
52, §10.5 ( "[S]pecific performance should be ordered only when the remedy at law is
inadequate").
119. See Hancock v. Dusenberry, 715 P.2d 360, 365 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986);
CUNNINGHAM, supra note 52, §10.5 ("[E]ach parcel of land is unique .... Hence, damages
are inadequate per se. ").
120. It is thought that substitute performance or damages are inadequate since no two
pieces of land are alike. See Suchan v. Rutherford, 410 P.2d 434, 438-39 (Idaho 1966). Thus,
specific performance may be the only way to compensate the nonbreaching party in a contact
for the sale of land. This philosophy is probably more true for the buyer than the seller. See
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Fundamental unfairness in the result

Although the contract between the Doyles and Ortega probably did
not reach the level of being unconscionable, 121 under the court's
interpretation of the contract, the remedies available to the buyer are
significantly reduced in comparison to those available to the seller. At
one time the courts required a mutuality of remedies. 122 Although a
mutuality of remedies is no longer required, 123 it is still a factor when
accompanied by other reasons. 124 Given all the other reasons discussed
above, 125 the court should have considered the disparity in remedies
resulting from its interpretation.
The result of the Doyle opinion is that the seller is entitled to
liquidated damages, but is not precluded from other damages if the buyer
breaches. This means the seller could also argue for "reliance damages,"
"restitution damages," or "expectation damages. " 126 In contrast, the
buyers are limited to liquidated damages, which puts them in the same
position as if they had never made the contract. Essentially, the court's
holding precludes them from their bargained-for expectations.
To better understand the difference between the buyers' and the
seller's positions, consider the following hypothetical based on the court's
interpretation of the default clause at issue in Doyle:
The purchase price is $30,000, and the buyer puts down earnest
money of $1,000. However, after the earnest money contract is signed
by both parties, the land decreases in value to $20,000. The buyer
breaches hoping only to lose only the earnest money invested.

CUNNINGHAM, supra note 52, § 10.5. If the seller breaches, then the buyer loses the
opportunity to buy that particular parcel with its unique characteristics. Money damages may
allow the buyer to purchase another parcel of land, but the parcel will be different in some
respects. ld.
Conversely, if the buyer breaches, the seller may also be entitled to specific performance.
However, the equitable importance may not be as strong. See id. If the seller receives money
damages for differences between the market price and out-of-pocket expenses associated with
finding and selling to a new buyer, then the non-breaching seller has been made whole without
the need for specific performance. Thus, the remedy at law is an adequate form of damages.
The unique character of the land is not as important to the seller since his or her interest is in
the price not the land itself. The price does not have unique characteristics like the parcel of
land. Nevertheless, courts continue to grant sellers specific performance. See id; see also
Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 846 P.2d 904, 908-09 (Idaho 1993).
121. See generally Smith v. Idaho State University, 760 P.2d 19, 23-24 (Idaho 1988)
(applying the unconscionability doctrine).
122. Suchan, 410 P.2d at 439-40.
123. See id.; CALAMARI, supra note 116, § 16-6; CUNNINGHAM, supra note 52, § 10.5.
124. Suchan, 410 P.2d at 439.
125. See supra Part III.A, B, C.
126. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 344 (1979).
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Under such a scenario, the $1,000 would be applied first to certain
costs associated with the transaction, and then would be split evenly
between the broker and the seller. 127 Assuming no costs, the seller
would get $500, one-half of the earnest money. Additionally, the seller
could bring an action for the other $9,500 for the lost benefit of his
bargain, expectation damages. Alternatively, the seller could seek
specific performance, again expectation damages.
Conversely, if the seller breaches the contract, the buyers have the
right to have the full amount of their earnest money returned. If some
of the earnest money has been applied toward costs related to the
transaction, the seller is required to make up the ditference. 128 Essentially, the buyers are put back in the same position as if the deal had
never been made and are denied the benefit of their bargain. If the
property had increased in price to $45,000, the buyers would not get
damages for the $15,000 increase but would simply have their $1,000 of
earnest money returned.
The disparity of remedies created under the Doyle opinion allows the
seller to enforce the contract if property values decline or default and sell
the property for a higher price if property values rise. Essentially, the
contract allows the seller to speculate while binding the buyer to the
contract. This result could be equitable if the parties had intended to be
bound by such a bargain, but the result should not stem from one party's
silence.

3.

Other issues related to liquidated damages clauses

In reaching its decision, the court seemed to have forgotten some
basic reasons for liquidated damage clauses. Damages for breaches are
often difficult to measure and prove, so parties create liquidated damages
clauses to measure what they expect the damages to be. 129 Courts have
held such clauses unenforceable if they are found to be a penalty or if
they are too far removed from the actual damages. 130
Public policy reasons for upholding liquidated damage clauses do not
apply to specific performance for two reasons. First, there is no need to
measure the damages since specific performance is literally the enforce-

127. See discussion of default clause supra part II. B.
128. !d.
129. See ULTA § 2-516 (1975). This section also states that "[a] party entitled to recover
under a valid liquidated-damages clause has no other remedy for any breach to which the
liquidated-damages clause applies unless other remedies are expressly reserved in the contract"
!d. § 2-516(b ). However, this position depends upon the clause being an exclusive liquidation
clause, which is dependant upon the parties negotiations and expressions. See DOBBS, supra
note 59, § 12.9(5).
130. See DOBBS, supra note 59, § 12.9(5).
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ment of the parties' actual bargain. Other than incidental costs or time
delays associated with enforcing the contract, specific performance equals
actual damages. For example, if the land value increases from $30,000
to $45,000 and the seller breaches, an action for damages could be
brought for $15,000. If specific performance is the remedy, then the
buyer would get a parcel of land worth $45,000 for the cost $30,000.
Both actions yield the same result. Second, specific performance cannot
be a penalty. Penalties in liquidated damage clauses occur when the
liquidated damages unreasonably exceed the actual damages. Specific
performance can not exceed the actual damages, so it can never be a
penalty. However, in spite of these theoretical inconsistencies, a valid
liquidated damage clause can be the exclusive remedy. 131
Other questions related to interpreting a liquidated damage clause
also arise. For example, was the default clause meant to be a floor or
ceiling? 132 The Doyle court interpreted the buyers' and seller's liquidated damage clauses differently. The seller's clause is interpreted to be a
floor while the buyers' clause is interpreted to be a ceiling. Clearly, a
court can find that a liquidated damages clause is a floor for one party
and a ceiling for another party as long as the parties explicitly agree to
such remedies in the contract. 133 However, the issue in Doyle is
whether the court should have interpreted the liquidated damages clause
as a ceiling when the parties did not negotiate the clause, and the parties'
intent is based on omissions rather than on explicit language. If a court
is allowed to interpret a party's omissions as well as terms not negotiated
during the bargaining process as waivers of rights, the contractual
bargaining process will dramatically change.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The clearly erroneous standard of review should have been used
rather than free review. The court based its standard of review on the
contract being unambiguous. However, the court had to stretch when it
declared, in effect, that a form contract, which does not include an
expressed reservation of specific performance, is an unambiguous
intention by that party to waive those rights. Furthermore, the opinion
shows no indication that other reasonable interpretations were considered.
For example, the liquidated damages clause could have been a floor
rather than a ceiling. Given the ambiguities in Doyle, the court should
have given greater deference to the trial court's findings, changed its

131. See ULTA § 2-516 (b) (1975); DOBBS, supra note 59, § 12.9(5).
132. DOBBS, supra note 59, § 12.9(5).
133. ld.
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standard of review to clearly erroneous, or remanded the case for further
inquiry.
The Doyle court's legal authority and analysis is insufficient to
support its opinion. To find a waiver of specific performance, the court
relied on dicta in Margaret H. Wayne Trust v. Lipsky, 134 which would
allow a waiver if the contract was clearly drafted. Whether the contract
was clearly drafted is highly debatable. Moreover, the court ignores
various facts that distinguish Lipsky from Doyle, including the Lipsky
opinion's implied waiver analysis. Furthermore, the court's claim that
returning the earnest money and specific performance are inconsistent
remedies is inaccurate since the buyers are not unjustly enriched and the
seller's damages are not increased.
Finally, the public policies underlying the court's opinion are
counter-intuitive and counter-productive. Generally, home buyers should
not be required to list their rights in order to preserve them. Denying
buyers the exchange they bargained for because of omissions on a
standardized form prepared by the seller is nothing short of inequity,
especially when the sellers' rights are preserved. Specific performance
was created to provide equity, yet the court's refusal to allow specific
performance in this case created inequity.
Robert L. Phillips

134. 846 P.2d 904 (Idaho 1993).

